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Abstract
We develop an approach to conducting large-scale randomized public policy exper-
iments intended to be more robust to the political interventions that have ruined
some or all parts of many similar previous efforts. Our proposed design is insulated
from selection bias in some circumstances even if we lose observations; our infer-
ences can still be unbiased even if politics disrupts any two of the three steps in
our analytical procedures; and other empirical checks are available to validate
the overall design. We illustrate with a design and empirical validation of an evalu-
ation of the Mexican Seguro Popular de Salud (Universal Health Insurance)
program we are conducting. Seguro Popular, which is intended to grow to provide
medical care, drugs, preventative services, and financial health protection to the 50
million Mexicans without health insurance, is one of the largest health reforms of
any country in the last two decades. The evaluation is also large scale, constituting
one of the largest policy experiments to date and what may be the largest random-
ized health policy experiment ever. © 2007 by the Association for Public Policy Analy-
sis and Management
INTRODUCTION
The history of public policy experiments is littered with evaluations torpedoed by
politicians appropriately attentive to the short-term desires of their constituents,
such as those who wind up in control groups without new services or who cannot
imagine why a government would randomly assign citizens to government pro-
grams. The fact that a scientific evaluation might maximize the interests of people
in the long run is often no match for the understandable outrage of constituents and
the embarrassment politicians may suffer in the short run. Scholars need to remem-
ber, however, that responsive political behavior by political elites is an integral
and essential feature of democratic political systems and should not be treated with
disdain or as an inconvenience. Instead, the reality of democratic politics needs to
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be built into evaluation designs from the start, or else researchers risk their plans
being doomed to an unpleasant demise.
Thus, although not always fully recognized, all public policy evaluations, includ-
ing ours, are projects in both political science and political science. We try to
account for this issue explicitly by developing a general randomized design that has
features which should enable an evaluation to survive even if certain portions of it
are destroyed through unexpected or ill-timed political interventions. Although
most of the individual features of our design have been used in prior research, their
advantages in accommodating political realities have only rarely been recognized
and chosen for this purpose—especially for experiments in the developing world.
These features may also be of use to other researchers designing policy research in
these necessarily political environments.1
We also report on applying our design to a large-scale evaluation of Seguro Popular
de Salud (SPS) we are conducting. SPS is a program of the Mexican federal govern-
ment designed to extend medical services, preventive care, pharmaceuticals, and
financial health protection to the approximately half of the Mexican population that
had no regular access to health care, particularly those with low incomes. In terms of
the national geographic coverage, the substantial cost of the program, the extent of
the benefits available to individuals, or the “aim to provide social protection in health
to the 50 million uninsured Mexicans” (Frenk, Sepúlveda, Gómez-Dantés, & Knaul,
2003, p. 1667), SPS represents one of the largest health policy reforms in the world
in the last two decades. SPS is highly visible and politically sensitive, and was a
prominent issue in the 2006 national election. In addition, because of the importance
of the evaluation to the Mexican government and the many politicians at every
level of government who could influence the program or evaluation—from the lead-
ers of the federal government, to the state governors, to national and state legislators,
to SPS program administrators at the federal and state level, and so on, all the way
down to administrators of local health care clinics and even frontline care givers—we
may even be especially vulnerable to the side effects of enterprising politicians
attempting to please their constituents. As such, although we believe that the ran-
domized evaluation design we propose here may find more general applicability, it
may be especially valuable in contexts like the SPS evaluation.
We first give some examples of political and other factors that affected previous
large-scale experiments and then offer a brief overview of the SPS program and the
origins of this evaluation. We then describe our experimental design, the expected
effects of SPS, and an empirical validation. The appendices briefly list variables avail-
able in our survey and describe our statistical analysis plans for the post-experimental
treatment period.2
LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL FAILURES
“Evaluation often confronts awkward political issues” and may even impose “per-
sonal costs to public servants” (Lewis, 2005, p. 202). Experiments conducted in ongo-
ing public policy programs, like ours, may have advantages in realism and external
validity, but they also pose special problems due to constraints imposed by politicians
and program administrators, and their interactions with subject expectations,
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1 The concept of a research design that survives even if randomization does not is occasionally mentioned
in the literature, such as the Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 134) concept of “fallback,” which is sometimes
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2 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to publisher’s
website and use search engine to locate article at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787.
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substitution effects, and the correspondence between the experimental treatment and
actual program benefits (Burtless, 1995; Heckman, 1992). In fact, two of the three con-
clusions of the participants in a European Regional Consultation (including World
Health Organization [WHO], several health ministries, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD], and the World Bank) about how to improve
the analysis of health policy implementations were more consideration of local “polit-
ical context” and speaking to “the political concerns of policymakers more explicitly”
(Murray & Evans, 2003, p. 61). Not only are experiments increasingly becoming
an important part of political science (Green & Gerber, 2002), but experimenters,
particularly those evaluating public policies, also need political science. This may
be particularly true in the developing world.
For example, immediately before the start of one of the treatment periods in
the evaluation of the Mexican Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación
(PROGRESA) antipoverty program, now called Oportunidades (Adato Coady, &
Ruel, 2000; Gertler, 2000, 2006), people in control areas who would not receive serv-
ices located adjacent to treatment areas, along with program administrators and state
governors, convinced federal administrators in charge of the program to include
them in the treatment group so they could also receive services (Greenberg &
Shroder, 2004, p. 436). Although this was good news in the short run for these
constituents, it potentially biased an aspect of the experiment. In fact, results from
early stages of the evaluation that demonstrated the program’s benefits led to
considerable popular pressure to end the evaluation and give services to everyone.
This was hardly a unique, or even unusual, occurrence in field experiments. In Pro-
ject STAR, a large education experiment designed to test the effects of class size,
about 10 percent of the students were moved to classes of different sizes than ones to
which they were randomly assigned at first, in part because of parental complaints
and organized lobbying (Krueger, 1999; Dee & Keys, 2004). In a subsidized meal pro-
gram in Kenya, upset parents in over half of the control schools organized to raise
funds for student meals to match what was being received in the treatment group
(Greenberg & Shroder, 2004, p. 399). In 1980, a field experiment conducted for the
local government in Stockholm was to consider expanding a bus route to a major
hospital and factory, but because at the last minute the trade unions objected to the
experiment, almost no subjects showed up (Bohm, 1984; Harrison & List, 2004).
Heckman and Smith (1995, p. 100) point out that over 90 percent of administrators
of training centers approached for the U.S. Department of Labor’s Job Training Part-
nership Act evaluation refused participation in the experiment, the most commonly
given reason for which was “ethical and public relations concerns.” These officials
were presumably worried about negative results casting doubts on their program or
their own performance. Administrators of a Labor Market Training study in Norway
circumvented randomization by selectively declaring enough subjects ineligible so
that the remaining subjects numbered only one more than the number of available
training slots to which they were to be randomly assigned (Torp, Rauum, Hernaes, &
Goldstein, 1993). In a British job training experiment called Job-Plan, more than
20 percent of controls received the training workshop treatment merely because they
asked to participate or were mistakenly required to do so (Greenberg & Shroder,
2004, pp. 446–447). A governmental agency, the California Youth Authority, abruptly
stopped conducting randomized experiments altogether for direct “political and
related ideological pressures” (Palmer & Petrosino, 2003). Indeed, “the potential list
of problems is endless” (Nickerson, 2005, p. 283).
Of course, researchers in many of the experiments described in this section found
ways to contribute valuable information about their intended subjects, despite their
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
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difficulties. And issues that are not as essentially political can also threaten research
designs, such as “the incongruence between treatment assignment and receipt”
(Camasso et al., 2003), complicated self-selection issues (Howell, 2004), and sample
attrition (Greenberg et al., 2006). But as Boruch (1997, pp. 182–184) writes, “Judg-
ments about the capacity of a site to engage in a controlled field test at times require
dedicating serious attention to the site’s political environment. [In evaluations,] the
possibility of failure is real. It must be planned for.”
THE SEGURO POPULAR POLICY INNOVATION
The plan the Mexican government passed began with a pilot phase in 2002 in 5 states,
and by the end of the first year was present in 20 states with about 296,000 families
affiliated. The law that formally created SPS as part of the “Sistema de Protección
Social en Salud” (System for Social Protection in Health) was a 2003 and 2004
modification of the Mexican General Health Law. Under the law, the Comisión
Nacional de Protección Social en Salud (National Commission for Social Protection
in Health) is in charge of supervising the system as a whole and coordinating with the
state offices of the program. Although the literal translation of “Seguro Popular” is
popular or universal insurance, and protection from the impoverishment that can
result from catastrophic health expenditures is a primary aim, it is not intended to be
a self-sustaining insurance program, and indeed the Spanish word for “insurance”
does not appear in the authorizing legislation. SPS is instead a social welfare program
that provides preventive and regular health care, as well as subsidies to reduce 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, primarily to lower income uninsured Mexicans,
and aims to strengthen the certification and effectiveness of local health facilities.
The federal government spent the equivalent of $795.5 million on SPS in 2005,
which was entirely new money spent on the health sector. When fully implemented,
they intend for SPS to increase total health spending in the country by an additional
1 percent of GDP compared to 2002.
As SPS operates now (August 2006), individuals must formally affiliate with SPS
to receive medical care. When they affiliate, SPS covers 249 health interventions
outlined by the Universal Catalog of Health Services, including the provision of
307 drugs associated with the services. These interventions treat the diseases
responsible for about 95 percent of the burden of disease in Mexico. Affiliated fam-
ilies pay a semiannual or annual quota that increases by decile of income, with the
lowest two deciles exempt. The largest share of the lowest two deciles are enrolled
in the Oportunidades antipoverty program and are formally affiliated with SPS
automatically when an area is ready to enter the program. (To access services
requires both formal affiliation and individual knowledge of this status, and so we
will also see how much of an advantage automatic rather than self-affiliation turns
out to be.) The federal government provides a contribution to the states for each
family affiliated, supplemented by a social quota per family from the states. Each
year, an office of the Health Ministry, independent of the National Commission,
certifies only those communities that have adequate medical facilities and decides,
in part on that basis, on the number of families each state is funded to attempt to
affiliate. Readying areas for affiliation thus requires state contributions as well.
The program is being rolled out in stages, increasing coverage each year. By the end
of 2003, 24 states were participating, with 614,000 families affiliated, and by 2005, all
32 states had some areas included, with 3.5 million families affiliated. The entire
uninsured population is expected to have the opportunity to affiliate by 2010, but,
because they would have to pay for SPS services and can choose to receive medical
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
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services elsewhere, we expect that many households in higher income deciles will not
find it attractive enough to affiliate.3
SPS represents a large part of a massive reform and constitutes one of the main
policy changes of the Fox administration. Passing the reform itself was an unex-
pected outcome of divided government in Mexico, advantaged by the support of
most of the governors (Lakin, 2005). Only the Distrito Federal (Mexico City) did not
participate in SPS when we started our evaluation, although it is included now. The
mayor of Mexico City, who would later announce as a candidate for president,
implemented his own competing health program and was not a supporter of SPS.
ORIGINS OF THE EVALUATION
Although a constitutional term limit means that the Mexican government that pro-
mulgated the plan could hold office for only one six-year term, those who designed
SPS intended to create a permanent entitlement that lasts well beyond the current
government. How one democratically elected government can “tie the hands” of, or
even influence, their democratically elected successors is a fundamental question
of practical governance as well as of normative democratic theory (Klarman, 1997;
Posner and Vermeule, 2002; Sterk, 2003). Although formal “entrenching legislative
rules” are often illegal, any change in the status quo can build citizen expectations,
alter international commitments, change the division of legislative votes needed to
pass alternative legislation, and otherwise constrain the choices of future govern-
ments. Scholars have developed formal theories (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990), extended
case studies of specific entrenched policies (Derthick, 1979), systematic empirical
evidence (Franzese, 2002), and philosophical arguments (Thompson, 2005) that elab-
orate on the consequences of this crucial commitment problem.
Mexican President Vicente Fox Quesada and Health Minister Julio Frenk Mora
presumably had strategies like these in mind, but they also implemented an open
plan for the scientific evaluation and persistence of their program. Their Ministry
of Health (MoH), and the independent National Institute of Public Health (INSP),
commissioned the Harvard University Team among the authors of the present
paper to lead an independent, ongoing scientific evaluation of SPS. Their theory
was that if we concluded that the program is a success, the next government would
be less likely to want to eliminate it and might even find it more difficult to do so
even if they wanted to. The benefit to the government, just as in science, is greatest
when the hypothesis is most vulnerable to being proven wrong. And they accord-
ingly have made themselves highly vulnerable because, if SPS or some portion of it
fails, we will say so as clearly as we will if it succeeds. We do not know whether this
justification will work in other evaluations, but it seems to have worked here and to
be a reasonable hypothesis that it might work in other situations.
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translation of Article 8 (Transitory) of the law states, “From the date that this Decree takes effect, every year
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Health of the Federal Budget, and resources for the function of health, requested by the federal government.
for the System for Social Protection in Health and approved by the Chamber of Deputies. Coverage of the
services for social protection in health will start by giving preference to the population in the first two
income deciles in areas with greatest deprivation, rural and indigenous areas, in compliance with the
registries kept by the federal government.” See also Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, Lezana, & Knaul (2006).
PAM263_04_20279.qxd  5/16/07  4:11 AM  Page 483484 / Experimental Design for Public Policy Evaluation
The MoH provided us access to government officials and experts on SPS, infor-
mation on the inner workings of the program, the ability to influence how SPS was
implemented so that we could more easily and rigorously evaluate it, and the means
to design and direct data collection plans. The officials requested no prepublication
approval of our conclusions.
Of course, like any public policy program, some parts of SPS will likely work and
others will probably not perform as expected. Thus, the main purpose of our ongo-
ing evaluation will probably not be a dichotomous declaration of victory or defeat
for the hypothesis that SPS succeeded, but rather a process of using modern tools
of social science to learn about how to improve the program and ultimately the
health of the Mexican population (see Heckman & Smith, 1995, p. 94).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We now describe our experimental design, detail the political and other issues that
arose in developing and then implementing it, and explain the choices and solutions
we made along the way. Briefly:
1. We define 12,284 contiguous geographic regions that tile Mexico’s 31 states. We
call these “health clusters,” each one of which includes an actual or future
health clinic or facility and the population catchment area around it.
2. We persuaded 13 of the 31 Mexican states, to participate in the evaluation,
which was composed of 7,078 (5,439 rural and 1,639 urban) health clusters.
3. We matched these health clusters in pairs so that members of each pair were
as similar as possible on a range of background characteristics.
4. For the first cohort of our experimental study, we selected 74 of these pairs of
health clusters from 7 states, portrayed in Figure 1, with selection based on
closeness of the match, likelihood of compliance with the experiment, and
necessary political and other criteria. (These 148 health clusters include 1,380
localities, approximately 118,569 households, and about 534,457 individuals.
We expect subsequent experimental cohorts, which we are now selecting, to
be roughly the same size.)
5. We randomly assigned one health cluster from each pair to receive encour-
agement to individuals to affiliate with SPS, along with the health facilities,
drugs, and doctors necessary to implement the program effectively. The other
health cluster in each pair received nothing extra.
6. At the time of random assignment, we conducted a baseline survey of the
health facility within each health cluster, and a survey of about 32,000 ran-
domly selected households within 50 of the 74 pairs of clusters (chosen based
on likelihood of compliance with encouragement to affiliate and similarity
of the clusters within each pair). We used this baseline household survey to
verify that the treated and control groups are similar on a wide range of
health characteristics and other variables. (We do not analyze the health facil-
ities survey in this paper.)
7. Ten months after random assignment, and then repeatedly at other intervals,
we conducted follow-up surveys of the health facilities and individuals within
each health cluster, which we used to ascertain the effect of the program.
We now discuss our dependent variables and the surveys we are fielding to meas-
ure them, how we found and defined a politically acceptable level at which to
randomize, how we insulate ourselves from selection bias in some circumstances
even if political interventions cause us to lose some of our observations, and the
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
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triple robustness property of our evaluation design and analysis strategy. We then
discuss limitations of our design.
Survey Measures of Program Outcomes
A public policy program like SPS has many targeted goals and multiple measurable
intermediate milestones along the way necessary to achieve the goals. We are
collecting data on our outcome measures via specially designed surveys of approx-
imately 32,000 individuals and a separate survey of the staffing and conditions at
the health facilities, both within the health clusters selected for our experiment. The
individual-level survey involved a random probability sample of households in these
areas, an interview with one person in each household who knew the most about
the household and its members, and one additional randomly selected individual
over age 18 (weighted via Kish tables to be representative; see Kish, 1949).
The variables measured include satisfaction with the health care provider, health
self-assessments, self-assessments of chronic conditions, and reports of risk factors
and health conditions (a detailed list appears in the Appendix).4 In addition to the
traditional survey items, we also include physical testing of blood pressure, choles-
terol, blood sugar, and HbA1c, the last two being indicators of diabetes. For many
respondents, having the medical tests and being offered immediate results were a
great motivation to participate in our study. Paradoxically, from the perspective of
surveys in the U.S., we greatly reduced nonresponse problems by telling respondents
about the medical tests at the outset and administering them—including three
separate finger pricks to draw blood—only as the very last step in the survey.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
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Figure 1. Mexican states participating in the first evaluation cohort.
4 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to publisher’s
website and use search engine to locate article at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787.
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The survey also included the standard battery of sociodemographic variables, as
well as proxies for several political variables to control for the possibility of respon-
dents biasing self-assessment answers to favor their preferred party in the 2006
election. The political variables would ideally have included party identification and
voting behavior questions, but we were advised (by the Federal Electoral Institute)
to avoid these so close to the election. We thus included reasonable proxies for these
in questions asked about whether the government should try to reduce differences
between rich and poor, whether the electricity industry should be privatized, and
whether government spending was aimed at the needs of the citizens.
We have already conducted one baseline survey, which was fielded at the time of
randomization of clusters to treated and control groups, in August 2005. On the
advantages of baseline surveys on improving precision, see Bloom, Richburg-Hayes,
and Black (2007); Glazerman, Myer, and Decker (2006). In addition, the true causal
effect of treatment on the outcome measures in this survey is zero, because treat-
ment was assigned at almost the same time and could not have had any real effect
yet. In the Empirical Validation section below, we estimate these causal effects on
the baseline, and use the frequency of estimates that deviate from zero as an indica-
tion of potential problems with our evaluation design. We plan a repeat survey of the
same respondents approximately 10 months later to see the early effects of the pro-
gram, and then several other surveys at longer intervals.
Politically Acceptable Randomization
Experimentation is best conducted via (1) random selection of subjects from the
population of interest, (2) random assignment of these subjects to treated and con-
trol groups, and (3) a large number of subjects. Random selection is typically infea-
sible in large scale policy experiments (except within local, nonrandomly selected
areas), and was infeasible for aspects of our experiment too. Studies without ran-
dom selection that are otherwise methodologically sound can produce valid causal
inferences for the subjects of the experiment, although not necessarily for the pop-
ulation at large. The practice in medical research, where random selection is rarely
feasible, is to repeat such experiments in many areas with diverse subject pools
until generalization to the larger target population becomes more plausible.
Although the expense of large scale field experiments often make repeating the
experiment difficult, we plan the same strategy in our evaluation by using multiple
waves of subjects in cohorts selected at different times throughout the country.
(Indeed, we have already begun the selection of our second experimental cohort.)
In contrast to random selection, random assignment of values of the treatment
variable is normally considered the sine qua non of experimental design. Its impor-
tance stems from guaranteeing in large samples that the treatment is unrelated to any
potential confounding variables even if those variables are not observed or known.
Randomization of medical care to individuals would avoid problems such as sick
citizens signing up to receive care more than the healthy, which might cause one to
conclude that the program made people ill even if the reverse were true. Unfortunately,
individual-level randomization is often politically unacceptable in policy evaluations
because government benefits are designed to be withheld only for some reason having
to do with an individual’s qualifications. Researchers often think of randomness as the
ultimate in fairness, because the assignments it produces would be the same even if
the name of the person receiving the random number changed; but this anonymity
property is often viewed by citizens and politicians as the ultimate in whimsy, ignor-
ing as it does how much the person not receiving the services needs them. In fact, in
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medical research, potential subjects are less likely to agree to participate in experi-
ments if randomness is part of the design (Kramer & Shapiro, 1984).
Random assignment was especially suspect in the Mexican government, given the
political problems accompanying it in the last large scale policy evaluation (of Opor-
tunidades, described above), and researchers from INSP and MoH first told us that
random assignment was impossible. However, program implementation always
includes some arbitrary decisions, normally made by lower level administrative
officials without the attention of political elites. When decisions are recognized as
arbitrary, randomizing those decisions becomes acceptable. Because some decisions
are always made below the level of political radar, we offer the generalization that
randomization is always acceptable at one level below that at which politicians care.
Once the right officials understood this point, it was easy to search together with
them to find the most informative way to randomize subject to reasonable political
constraints (see also Green & Gerber, 2002, p. 821).
In the SPS evaluation, we could not randomize individuals to affiliation because
it would have been politically and ethically unacceptable, but also because every
citizen is technically permitted to affiliate even when no health facility is 
nearby. The level of random assignment we chose is the health cluster, which is a
geographic unit we defined for the purposes of the evaluation. We define a health
cluster as an actual or planned health clinic (Clínicas, centros de salud, hospitales,
etc.), and the catchment area around it. Put differently, one can never randomize
entitlements, and SPS is designed as an entitlement at the individual level. However,
SPS is not an entitlement at the cluster level while the program is being rolled out.
Our study is an example of what is variously called a “place-randomized” (Boruch
et al., 2004), “group-randomized” (Murray, 1998), or “cluster-randomized” (Donner &
Klar, 2000) trial.
To construct these clusters, we worked with the Núcleo de Acopio y Análisis de Infor-
mación en Salud at INSP and, in negotiation with the state governments, first mapped
the location of every current or planned health clinic in the country and then
attempted to define the catchment area around each as travel time of less than one
day to the clinic. For “travel time” we used graphic information system (GIS) tech-
nology to approximate the actual time it takes for an individual in each household,
using transportation methods available, to travel to the closest health clinic where he
or she could receive care (rather than the linear distance “as the crow flies”). We
attempted to account for factors such as available roads; whether the roads were used
for cars, public transportation, or walking; and natural boundaries like rivers without
bridges. We used localidades (localities) in rural areas as building blocks, but within
AGEBs (Area Geoestadística Básica, which correspond roughly to U.S. census tracts)
in urban areas, we used detailed street-level information and location of the health
facility. With helpful checks performed by the states, we defined 10,616 rural and
1,668 urban health clusters nationwide, and together these 12,284 clusters tile the
whole country, other than Mexico City, which did not participate in SPS at the time.
Health cluster-level random assignment was politically feasible because, even
without our experiment, SPS must be rolled out to different parts of the country
over time. This is the case because funds, health clinics, doctors, and drugs do not
exist to give everyone access all at once, and so affiliation will have to be explicitly
encouraged in some areas, and other areas will need to wait. The special advantage
of health clusters as the unit of randomization in this context is that it is effectively
the level at which the policy decision to roll out the program is made, the level at
which funds are spent, and the level at which health clinics are located, built,
stocked, funded, and staffed. It is thus both administratively feasible and enables us
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to estimate at least one causal effect, in these or similar areas, at the level of inter-
est and of most relevance to policymakers who would choose to implement or roll
out the program to new areas.
In addition to the causal effect on the policy decision to implement the program
in a health cluster on the health and well-being of its population, we would also like
to estimate the effect of any one individual’s affiliation with SPS on that person.
Although we did not randomly assign affiliation at the individual level, we can use
the random assignment of health clusters (in what is called an “encouragement
design”) to estimate the causal effect of individual level affiliation, as if it were
randomly assigned.5
The particular health clusters to be randomized must be chosen from those ready
for affiliation and politically feasible to randomize. We started with all 12,284
health clusters and then eliminated areas from the experiment in five categories.
First are areas that the state governors and their administrations decided should
receive SPS no matter what, and thus are not subject to our experimental assign-
ment; these decisions may be for whatever technical, policy, or political reasons the
officials deem appropriate. We were not able to conduct a detailed study of how
these decisions were made, as they were the result of a complicated negotiation
process between the SPS administration and the states. Second, we eliminated
areas in states that were not yet participating in SPS. Third, because providing the
financial means to use health care is useless when doctors, hospitals, or drugs are
unavailable, areas with inadequate or nonexistent health facilities that the govern-
ment could not improve in our time frame were excluded from both SPS and the
experiment, at this stage. Fourth, we eliminated from the experiment areas with
which many families were affiliated prior to our experiment, because random
assignment would have had little effect (or in other words, our encouragement to
affiliate would likely be ignored). And finally, we dropped very small rural clusters
(under 1,000 population) and kept only those urban clusters with more than 2,500
and fewer than 15,000 population.
Then, during the annual negotiation between the states and the federal government
on which areas will receive the go-ahead to begin affiliating families with SPS, we
were offered a large number of health clusters we could randomize. The largest
number we could afford to collect data on was 148, which we chose to optimize our
matching criteria and compliance with the experiment (we describe these procedures
in a separate section below). This strategy was politically acceptable because the
original plan for SPS was to phase it in over six years, and so we are able to exploit
the natural phase-in delay in the program to encourage affiliation in randomly
selected treated areas and to do nothing in control areas. All clusters would eventually
be included in SPS and no absolute restriction was placed on individual affiliation at
any time. Our baseline and follow-up surveys are conducted within these clusters.
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5 The basic idea of an encouragement design is to use health-cluster random assignments as an instrument
with known properties to estimate the direct effect of affiliation (for example, Hirano, Imbens, Rubin, &
Zhou, 2000; Frangakis, Rubin, & Zhou, 2002; Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 2003). The key issue is
ascertaining who complies with the experiment—affiliates when encouraged to and does not affiliate when
not encouraged—which can be estimated directly with this design. In most cases, we expect few individu-
als to affiliate and use services in areas not encouraged by our experimental assignment, because they
would need to travel far to affiliate, and then when affiliation takes effect 30 days later, would have to travel
back for any needed medical treatment. Lower income individuals in randomly assigned encouragement
areas are highly likely to sign up for the program, as it is free or inexpensive for them, whereas upper
income people who have their own health insurance and separate hospitals are much less likely to affiliate.
Oportunidades families, which constitute roughly 90 percent of families in the lowest two deciles of
income, are affiliated by the government automatically.
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We measure outcome variables at the level of the health facility for all 148 clusters
and (due to financial constraints) at the household and individual level for 100 of
these (selected from the 148 with rules we describe below). Although we describe
what we plan to do with both, we only analyze the individual-level baseline survey
in this paper.
Losing Clusters without Losing Balance
The most common experimental design is classical randomization, which in our
application would assign each health cluster to the treated or control group based
on a separate coin flip. This design makes it possible to base inferences on a simple
difference in means between the two groups, because the observed and unobserved
characteristics of the control and treated clusters are the same, at least on average.
Randomization, then, makes it possible to avoid resorting to the usual model-
dependent regression adjustments that are required in observational studies.
Classical randomization works fine if all health clusters in the study at the start
remain in until the end. However, if even one cluster is lost—due to political inter-
vention, measurement errors, incorrect randomization, or for any other reason—we
would then no longer be guaranteed that the treated and control groups are com-
parable on average, and the benefits of randomization would be lost.
Any loss of observations in a classical randomization study can thus result in imbal-
ance between the groups, which can generate bias. For example, the PROGRESA
evaluation described above used classical randomization and had some loss of obser-
vations. Although empirical evidence in that study did “not indicate any systematic
differences” between the treated and control groups on the observed variables, the
randomization no longer guarantees that any unobserved variables must be similarly
balanced on average across the groups (Behrman & Todd, 1999, p. 8).
Especially given this previous experience, we must expect to lose health clusters,
and so we need a design that allows some clusters to be lost, under at least some
circumstances, without also losing the advantages of randomization. Thus, we turn
to what is known as a randomized cluster matched pair design, which, if used appro-
priately, has a self-protecting property that has rarely been discussed in print, even
though it may have been used in practice (Donner & Klar, 2000). In matched pair
randomization, we first select pairs of health clusters that are matched, or at least
as similar as possible, on a large set of available background characteristics. Then,
by flipping a coin, we randomly choose one of the two clusters within each pair to
receive treatment and the other to be the control. The result of this process is exact
balance between the entire treated and control groups of health clusters on all
variables included in the matching for which exact matches among the clusters are
available, or near matches otherwise. Variables not matched on are balanced by
randomization and therefore only match on average.
Matching on covariates before randomization in this way (compared to classical
randomization) “can increase balance on these covariates, increase the efficiency of
estimation and the power of hypothesis tests, and reduce the required sample size
for fixed precision or power,” and if the covariates are unrelated to variables in
our analysis, matching “does not harm statistical efficiency or power” (Greevy, Lu,
Silver, & Rosenbaum, 2004, p. 264). Matching before randomization thus does not
seem to have significant disadvantages, except in much smaller sample sizes than
we have, where efficiency is still improved (Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007), but power
can be reduced (Klar & Donner, 1997; Raudenbush, Martinez, & Spybrook, 2007);
it also possesses other advantages discussed below.
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The key additional advantage of the matched pair design from our perspective is
that it enables us to protect ourselves, to a degree, from selection bias that could
otherwise occur with the loss of clusters. In particular, if we lose a cluster for a
reason related to one or more of the variables we matched on, such as low-income
areas or clusters within cities, then no bias would be induced for the remaining
clusters. That is, whether we delete or impute the remaining member of the pair
that suffered a loss of a cluster under these circumstances, the set of all remaining
pairs in the study would still be as balanced—matched on observed background
characteristics and randomized within pairs—as the original full data set. Thus, any
variable we can measure and match on when creating pairs removes a potential
for selection bias if later on we lose a cluster due to a reason related to that variable.
Selection bias might still occur under this design if, for political or other reasons,
clusters were lost after the start of the study for reasons both unrelated to our
matched variables and related to the treatment assignment, or by selecting on the
casual effect, but we would be fully protected from bias due to any variable we were
able to match on. Classical randomization, which does not match on any variables,
lacks this protective property.6
A Triply Robust Evaluation Design
A key part of our evaluation design includes (1) paired matching of health clusters,
(2) randomization of treatment and control within pairs, and (3) parametric adjust-
ment to estimate the quantities of interest, each of which we describe in this sec-
tion. Under weak regularity conditions, when any one of these steps works
as planned, we will be able to make valid causal inferences even if the other two
parts fail. We call this property triple robustness (see Robins & Rotnitzky, 2001; Ho,
Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).7
An Algorithm for Paired Matching
The most commonly used matching algorithms are designed to apply to data for
which the treatment assignment is known prior to matching (Ho et al., 2007). In our
problem, which is known mathematically as “nonbipartite matching” and creates n
pairs from 2n health clusters, pairing must be completed prior to treatment assign-
ment. Optimal algorithms have been developed for this problem that are appropriate
when all clusters are randomized simultaneously (Greevy et al., 2004).
In our evaluation, however, only a simplified textbook-like summary of our pro-
cedures would sound like we had simultaneously randomized all our clusters.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
Published on behalf of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
6 Randomized matched pair designs also have the advantage that they can be used to provide pair-level
causal effect estimates. Indeed, a noisy estimate would be, for any outcome measure, the treated value
minus the control value in the same pair. Statistical techniques can also be used to reduce the noise. Pair-
level causal effects can provide valuable information if SPS is having different effects in different parts of
the country, or is more or less successful for certain types of population groups. For example, we suspect
that SPS will have a bigger impact in low-income, rural areas, because those are the areas for which it
was primarily designed. Other possibilities could also be explored but would, of course, remain more
uncertain and in need of replication in other cohorts.
7 Each of the three components of our design have been used before separately, and sometimes in com-
binations, in previous research. Paired matching is a special case of “blocking” in the experimental
design literature, where the general advice has long been to “block what you can and randomize what
you cannot” (Box, Hunger, & Hunter, 1978, p. 103). Paired matching typically provides higher levels of
variance control than other forms of blocking. To our knowledge, the triple robustness property has not
been noted directly before, nor have its advantages for creating fail-safe experimental research designs.
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Unfortunately, conducting an experiment in the real world of politics and policy is
not remotely as controlled as most textbook discussions of research design. We con-
structed our matches in real time, while the SPS program was being rolled out, under
conditions of uncertainty and considerable time pressure. At the same time, the states
and the federal government were negotiating on which regions had health care facil-
ities above the threshold for qualification, how much money would be available in
this round for affiliation, and which health clusters would be in the experiment and
thus subject to our decision about who would get SPS. During this time, information
on the geographic location, and thus definition of individual health clusters, was
improving, data coding background covariates were being corrected, and our data
sets were being continually updated. Simultaneous matching was also not desirable,
because we could only afford to conduct our individual-level survey in a subset of the
randomized pairs, and so we wanted to optimize better with respect to this subset
than we could with simultaneous matching in a larger group.
There were also inevitable misunderstandings along the way, such as when an early
attempt at randomization caused some states to inform us that we should discard
two-thirds of the pairs we thought we had randomized. Upon investigation, we found
that the states wanted to allow only the pairs in the experiment where the cluster
assigned treatment was the one (of the two) they wanted to receive SPS. We explained
that investigator control of the experiment was essential for scientific randomization
(a procedure that introduces no bias because randomizations are by definition mutu-
ally independent), and so we began the process from scratch.
Because optimal matching of the entire set of clusters all at once was both infea-
sible and undesirable, we designed a new algorithm better suited to the political
problems we faced. We call this an optimally greedy algorithm. Whereas optimal
algorithms simultaneously adjust all pairs to optimize a global objective function
(such as minimizing the average distance between members of each pair), classic
greedy algorithms find the closest match for each cluster one at a time. Greedy algo-
rithms are not invariant to the order of matching, and typically match in arbitrary
order, such as by observation number, but have the advantage of finding the best
match for any one cluster among those available to match. In contrast, our opti-
mally greedy algorithm minimizes the minimum distance between clusters within
pairs across the entire set of data available at any one time to match. The arbitrari-
ness of greedy matching is thus avoided, and the advantages of optimal matching
are available for any one set of clusters considered together. This algorithm also met
our needs because we would only be able to conduct our individual level survey in
some, but not all, of our clusters, and so wanted to use the best matches there but
still use the full set of pairs to analyze the facilities survey, which would be fielded
in all the pairs.
To apply any matching algorithm requires a metric to measure the distance
between the clusters within each pair. In our case, we exact match on state and urban-
icity, and within those strata use the Mahalanobis metric to compute distances.
The Mahalanobis distance is a measure of the difference between the values of all the
control variables in the treated and control clusters.8 The complete procedure, then,
is as follows: within a state-urbanicity stratum, compute the Mahalanobis distance
for every possible pair of clusters available to be matched at any one time; choose the
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the variance matrix computed from the observed data to be matched. To reduce sensitivity to outliers in
small samples, we improve on this procedure by estimating this matrix from the largest set of health
clusters available to us at the time of matching.
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pair with the smallest distance and remove it; and repeat until all clusters in the
stratum are matched.
Ideally, the background characteristics would include the outcome measures we
wished to study, measured prior to randomization, but these were not available.
Instead, we followed the usual procedure and included all available plausibly relevant
background characteristics. These variables represent demographics distributions,
housing infrastructure, insurance, population, characteristics of health facilities, dis-
abled indicators, literacy, geographic characteristics, SPS program participation,
income, and others.9 Although changes in this list led to different pairs being matched,
the differences did not seem overly sensitive to specification.
The great advantage of matching geographic areas is that we can always learn
more about a pair of clusters than the information our quantitative data indicates
by simply visiting the area or talking with those who are familiar with it. When
matching individuals in surveys, or other anonymous units, this kind of external
qualitative information is typically unavailable, and in fact the particular units
matched rarely make an appearance in publications. In our work, we studied geo-
graphic maps like those in Figure 2 and researched the pairs found by our algo-
rithm. We used this process mostly to find data errors and to suggest new variables
to include in our matching algorithm. Although a similar procedure might cause
one to modify the quantitative matches, our discussions with local officials indi-
cated that this did not seem necessary. We found this result somewhat reassuring,
that we had matched on all the relevant background characteristics and especially
all the ones that the politicians and officials seemed to be immediately aware of.
The success of our matching procedure was largely a function of how many clusters
we could persuade officials to make available to us for matching. The more that were
available, the better matches we were able to find. To evaluate the quality of the
matches, we plotted numerous graphs like that on the left side of Figure 3. This par-
ticular graph gives a histogram of the absolute value of the difference in the proportion
of the over-65 populations between clusters within each pair. As can be seen for this
particular variable, most of the clusters stack up at very nearly zero difference, as we
would want, with some others scattered at slightly larger differences. We found simi-
lar results for many other graphs of the variables we used to match.
We also used the Mahalanobis distance metric to summarize the differences within
the pairs on all variables, an example of which for rural clusters is displayed on the
horizontal axis in Figure 4. The horizontal position of the clusters on the graph
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9 The specific variables included in both urban and rural clusters include total population, average
education, average rooms per occupant, percent female, percent between 0 and 4 years old, percent
under age 18, percent with and without social security rights, percent over 5 years old who were living
in the localidad (or AGEB) in both 1995 and 2000, percent disabled, percent married, percent Catholic,
percent employed, percent employed in the secondary/tertiary sector, percent living in households
making less than twice the minimum wage, percent of households headed by women, weighted margin-
alization index, a series of housing infrastructure variables (condition of the walls, roof, floor other than
dirt, electricity, water access, sewer, other plumbing, and refrigeration), percent in Oportunidades,
health infrastructure variables (day beds, consultorios, doctors, and nurses). In addition, we added
for the rural clusters percent over 15 years old and illiterate, the percent employed in primary sector, per-
cent over age 5 speaking an indigenous language, and an index comprising the sum of a series of health
infrastructure variables describing characteristics of health facilities within 120 minutes of the cluster,
area, dummy for affiliation of the health center to SPS, population within 1km without social security.
And we added for the urban clusters percent over age 15 and literate; the percent over age 60, and over
age 65; percent in IMSS; altitude; and the number of operating rooms, and general or overnight beds, in
the nearest medical facility. Of these variables, four had a few missing values, which we multiply
imputed as described in King, Honaker, Joseph, and Sheve (2001).
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Figure 2. Matched pairs in Estado de México (left graph) and Morelos (right graph).
Within states and an urban/rural distinction, health clusters were matched in pairs
based on proximity to each other on various measured background characteristics.
Graphs like this identify the exact clusters paired, and enabled us to use qualitative
knowledge of these areas to check our quantitative matching algorithm.
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Figure 3. Balance in urban matched pairs in the over-65-year-old population, pre-
randomization (left graph) and in the rural infant population, post-randomization
(right graph). These graphs provide examples of the many checks we did to verify
that our treated and control groups were similar on many measured background
characteristics.
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Figure 4. Choosing a subset of pairs for survey. We conducted our survey in 100 of
the 148 health clusters with small Mahalanobis distances (pairs of clusters that were
most similar) and low percentages above the first two deciles of income (where we
expected highest compliance with our experiment). This graph portrays all rural pairs
of clusters, for which we chose those represented as the points under the curved line.
reveals one badly matched pair all the way at the right, a few that are moderately bad
in the middle, and that most are quite well matched on the left.
We also use the Mahalanobis distance and this same graph for a separate purpose.
That is, although we conducted a survey of hospital facilities in every cluster in our
study, we could only afford an individual-level survey in 100 of the 148 clusters. We
decided that to keep enough power, our primary effort in this cohort of the experiment
would be to estimate effects in rural areas and so we retained 90 of the 100 clusters
from rural areas. We kept the remaining 10 urban clusters primarily so that our sur-
vey teams and the state and federal administrations would learn from the experience
and be better prepared for future experimental cohorts of clusters in our ongoing eval-
uation. (We plan for the second cohort of our experiment to be from urban clusters.)
To choose the particular 100 of 148 clusters, we used two criteria: the closeness of the
match, measured via the Mahalanobis distance, and the probability of compliance
with our randomized experimental encouragement, which we measured with the per-
centage of residents in the first two deciles of income (estimated from the 2002
National Income and Expenditure Survey). Figure 4 gives an example of the analysis
we did for the rural clusters, with the Mahalanobis distance between elements of the
pair on the horizontal axis and the percent above decile two in each pair on the verti-
cal axis. Each dot then represents a pair of health clusters, and those in the lower left
corner marked off by the curved line were pairs we chose to survey.
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Random Assignment
After pairing clusters, we flipped the digital equivalent of a fair coin to choose one of
the two clusters for treatment. Treatment was intended to include bringing the health
clinic or hospital above a specified threshold level of doctors, specialists, nurses, equip-
ment, office hours, technology, and drugs. It also was supposed to include setting up
an MAO (Módulo de Atención y Orientación, or “service and orientation stand”) in the
health cluster, where citizens can go to affiliate, and advertising to encourage individ-
uals to affiliate via radio, television, loudspeakers from cars, knocking on doors, paint-
ing walls (the Mexican version of billboards), or by other means. In addition, Mexican
families enrolled in the Oportunidades antipoverty program, which comprises most of
those in the lower two deciles of income, are affiliated automatically by the state.
States receive funds only after affiliation is confirmed for each family, so motivation
to encourage affiliation was strong. We also conveyed that we were more likely to be
able to detect a positive effect of SPS, assuming one existed, if they did their best to
affiliate in treatment clusters and to leave control clusters alone.
Encouragement efforts in our treatment clusters began in late August, 2005. Our
survey began shortly thereafter. We plan to monitor affiliation efforts via studying
the official Padrón, which is the confidential roster listing all persons affiliated
and the trimesters they affiliated.
We also ran checks for the quality of both the matching and random assignment
by examining overlapping histograms of treated compared to control clusters.
The right graph in Figure 3 gives an example of a histogram (in the form of a kernel
density estimate) for the proportion of population aged 0–4 years. The unbroken
line gives the histogram for the treated group, and dashed is for the control group.
As can be seen, the two are not identical, but they are close. These histograms
are not identical because of the finite sample size and nonexact matches: As the
number of health clusters with the same quality of matches grows, randomization
guarantees that these histograms get closer and closer. Similarly, if clusters were
available to produce exact matches, our matching algorithm would generate pairs
of clusters that made these histograms the same.
Parametric Adjustment
Once the data are in, we need to compute a causal effect for every outcome variable.
If matching is successful at balancing all potential confounding covariates, then a
simple difference in means for an outcome measure between the treated and control
groups would give an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the policy decision
to implement SPS at the level of the health cluster. Even if randomization fails, a
difference in means could still give an unbiased estimate if the two groups happened
to remain balanced on the observed background characteristics and any remaining
imbalance were unrelated to the outcome variables. Similarly, if the randomization
worked as designed, but we failed to measure and match on one or more important
confounders or variables correlated with them, then the difference in means would
still be unbiased. (And in either case, as described previously, we are protected from
selection bias if we lose a cluster, to the extent that we matched on variables related
to the reason for the loss.)
However, if both the randomization fails in some way and the matching was inad-
equate, then a simple difference in means between the control and treated groups
can produce a biased estimate of the causal effect on the outcome variables meas-
ured in our surveys. Thus, if anything goes wrong and cannot be fixed with both of
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these first two steps, we would drop the difference in means analysis. Instead, we
would follow and adjust parametrically for any observed differences that may
remain between the treated and control groups (Ho et al., 2007; Raudenbush,
Martinez, & Spybrook, 2007). Thus, for outcome variables that are roughly contin-
uous when aggregated to or measured at the level of the health cluster, a difference
in means is equivalent to a linear regression of the outcome variable on the treat-
ment indicator, with the coefficient on this indicator revealing the difference in
means. To adjust parametrically, we would add to the regression any relevant
pretreatment covariates, or functions thereof, that may still be confounders, possi-
bly including interactions. If the parametric form is correct, bias will be reduced
and the standard error will normally drop too. Other types of outcome variables
would be analyzed by the relevant standard estimation approach and can include
models for binary variables like logit, for event counts such as negative binomial
regression, etc. (This procedure can even be made resistant to errors in the data
introduced by political interventions we do not become aware of, or other prob-
lems, by using robust estimation techniques; Western, 1995; Zaman, Rousseeuw, &
Orhan, 2001.) The right graph of Figure 3 gives an example of some small differ-
ences that remain in one of our background variables after matching and random-
ization that we adjust for parametrically.
As a result of this procedure, if either or both matching and randomization fail in
some way, but the parametric specification adjusts appropriately for the relevant
confounding variables or their correlates, then we can still obtain accurate estimates
of the causal effects. Of course, this last step is a fail-safe, last resort technique, as
fixing data problems by collecting better data is generally preferred to fixing them
with assumption-based statistics after the fact (Wilde & Hollister, 2007). And valid
randomization is still the only technique known to be able to avoid confounding
from variables not measured or related to those matched on or adjusted for.
Nevertheless, when planning experiments in a political environment, it pays to have
this final piece of our triple robustness strategy available, because at least when the
model is correct, appropriate bias-reducing adjustments can be made.
Design Limitations
Our evaluation design has several limitations that our subsequent analyses will
have to deal with, in some cases via more sophisticated statistical procedures and
in others via auxiliary data collection.
Most importantly, our clusters do not represent a random sample from the popula-
tion of all clusters nationwide, and so generalization will need to await the results from
new cohorts of our experiment. Of the 5,439 rural and 1,639 urban health clusters
defined for the 13 states convinced to participate in the evaluation, we were able to
retain 148 clusters in the study, including 55 rural and 19 urban pairs. Some pairs
from each of 7 states are included, including Guerrero (1 rural and 6 urban), Jalisco
(1 urban), Estado de México (35 rural, 1 urban), Morelos (12 rural, 9 urban), Oaxaca
(3 rural, 1 urban), San Luis Potosí (2 rural), and Sonora (2 rural, 1 urban).
Figure 1 shows that the states in our experiment (in gray) are spread throughout
the country. This diversity is useful both for generating a sample that is somewhat
more representative and, especially for the states with fewer pairs, for helping us
establish connections, communications, and practice with officials in these states for
future cohorts of health clusters we intend to begin at later dates. However, many
factors influenced their selection, only some of which we were able to observe
and record. If other features of our evaluation design work as planned, we will have
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unbiased estimates for these areas, but further research, survey comparisons with
national statistics, and subsequent waves of our experiment are required before we
can ascertain whether results we find apply more broadly. We thus followed the
medical model of maximizing the chances that our random assignment would
be executed as planned, so that inferences for the sample at hand are valid, even
though selection into the sample was not randomized or fully controlled.
We can briefly compare our sample with that from ENSANut 2005 (Encuesta
Nacional de Salud y Nutrición, a national survey of 45,241 Mexican adults, to give a
sense of the areas in our evaluation. The single biggest difference between the two
surveys is that our baseline survey has an (intentional) rural bias, given that 90 out of
the 100 clusters we chose to include in the study are rural, whereas the nationally rep-
resentative sample of the ENSANut is approximately the opposite. Only 10 percent of
the households in the baseline are from urban areas, whereas 77 percent of the house-
holds in the ENSANut are drawn from urban areas. The demographic compositions
of the two samples are otherwise fairly similar. The ratio of male to female heads of
household is almost the same in the two samples, as are the distribution of education,
and age composition of the primary respondents.
Other design limitations include the fact that we were unable in our prerandom-
ization matching process to control for the proximity of our control clusters to
treatment clusters, or other clusters in which SPS was already in operation, and so
we will need to check for any spillover effects and correct for them if necessary.
More detailed verification will be useful, such as verifying from the Padrón how
many citizens affiliated in each of our health clusters and how much use they made
of SPS medical services. The level of encouragement used in different clusters may
also have varied in ways we were unable to monitor.
Although our design is protected from selection bias when losing clusters due to
reasons related to the variables used to create the matched pairs, we only have 148
clusters in total (and 100 in which our individual-level survey was conducted), and
so we risk having little power if we lose too many. Our experiment contains many
outcomes, which is valuable, but also risks a “multiple comparisons” problem if not
analyzed properly; publicly stated ex ante theoretical expectations will ameliorate
some of this problem, but, as the next section details, disagreement about likely spe-
cific outcomes requires that some of this problem will need to be addressed by
statistical procedures during the analysis stage. And finally, although our evaluation
design is robust to some types and degrees of political intervention, no design can
avoid all such problems. Indeed, like most evaluations, ours could be terminated at
any time by the same government officials now facilitating its continuation or by
the next elected government.
EXPECTED PROGRAM EFFECTS
In order to ascertain the intended goals of SPS, we convened, on three separate
occasions, large meetings of political appointees, administrators, and local experts
from the federal and state governments. We elicited from these individuals and
groups, in a variety of qualitative and quantitative ways, where and when they
thought SPS would be likely to succeed and fail. Initially, we attempted to pin down
individual quantitative predictions by giving them lists of the outcome variables
with likely confidence intervals sizes for the evaluation. If this worked, we would
then “tie our own hands” and explain at that time, before the data came in, exactly
what analyses we would run when these data eventually became available and what
we would conclude if the results turned up in different ways.
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Although these meetings were informative, our strategy did not work as planned.
The “Mexican government” is no more a unitary actor with a single opinion than
any other government, and the groups that marshaled support for, passed, run, and
are responsible for SPS are far too diverse to expect them to give precise or even
qualitatively similar answers to our quantitative questions. We thus abandoned this
strategy and instead report here our qualitative understanding of the government’s
expectations.
The groups we spoke with were nearly unanimous on the importance of the
program and its likelihood of eventual and considerable overall success, but there
was disagreement about how the program would have its effects, which effects
would be detectable given the likely sizes of our confidence intervals, how long the
program would take to start showing health effects on the population, and in which
regions or areas the program would have the biggest effect. Other disagreements
were effectively based on different theories of individual behavior, how much of the
funds would get to the clinics and people who need it, and the likely compliance
behavior of the Mexican population with medical advice.
For one example, because a central feature of the program is financial protection
from catastrophic health expenditures, many believed this would work, but some
thought that it would not be easily detectable in the short run. The source of this
disagreement was based on different understandings of how huge medical expenses
now affect the population prior to SPS. Some believe that citizens who are suddenly
hit with some very expensive medical payment have a similarly sudden and large
reduction in their nonhealth disposable income. Others believe that people instead
find partial solutions that they can afford. So, for example, when having a child,
instead of “selling the farm” to pay for a stay at the hospital miles away and all the
associated care with OB/GYN physicians and specialized equipment, the idea is that
people without much income instead opt for a less expensive midwife and so do not
incur a catastrophic expenditure. If the latter is true, then SPS will improve care and
reduce family expenditures, but the effect will not be as large or dramatic and so may
not be as easy to detect. And still others are mainly focused on catastrophic expendi-
tures that come from expensive medicines paid for over a longer period of time.
If SPS is to be a success, the initial unambiguous sign will be that utilization
of medical services will increase. The number of visits to health clinics, doctor
visits, medicines prescribed, etc., should increase, as should the number of medical
diagnoses made. Individual health expenditures should drop, including total out-
of-pocket spending, catastrophic expenditures (paying more than 30 percent of
disposable income on health), and impoverishment due to health care payments
(households pushed below the poverty line because of health care spending). If SPS
is an effective program, we would expect to see these changes relatively quickly,
although perhaps not all by 10 months. We expect most other causal effects of SPS
estimated not to show detectable effects by a mere 10 months, but we decided to
measure many others (summarized in a section above) in order to collect baseline
information, as a check on our design, and to establish a framework to monitor
conditions in the long run. The effects of SPS on a few of these other measures
might also conceivably be detectable in our first follow-up survey.
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
As a supplement to our triply robust evaluation design, and our paired matching
that protects us in some circumstances from selection bias even if we lose some
health clusters, we now report an empirical check of the validity of all the steps
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(taken together) that we have implemented thus far. To do this, we estimate the
causal effect of treatment assignment on a large number of our outcome variables
measured in our baseline survey, standardized to the same scale (by dividing by the
standard error).10
We present these analyses, for all of our 31,856 respondents, in the graph at the left
of Figure 5. This graph gives causal effect estimates for our variables organized into
eight categories (with individual items listed in the first appendix.11 Each effect is
estimated twice, once without parametric correction (on the graph in open circles)
and once with it (the black disks). The corresponding open and closed diamonds are
the average for each category. The horizontal axis is denominated in standard devia-
tion units. If all the outcome measures were independent, we would expect 95 percent
of the points on the graph to be between 2 and 2. The outcome measures are surely
not independent, but most are indeed in this interval and, with one partial exception
(discussed below), all the averages within categories are fairly close to zero.
Similar results appear in the right graph, which uses the same analytical proce-
dures applied to low-income respondents (in Oportunidades), and in the two graphs
in Figure 6 for relatively more wealthy families (those with formal sector health
insurance and/or a large asset count) on the left, and those who are neither poor nor
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(see Honaker and King, 2006; King et al., 2001; Rubin, 1987), and translating the coefficients from the
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11 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to publisher's
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Figure 5. Effects of random assignment on outcome measures at baseline, for all
families (left graph) and poor families, in Oportunidades (right graph). If the exper-
iment were implemented properly, we would see zero effect (near the vertical line)
plus or minus random error. The horizontal axis is in standard deviation units, and
so we expect relatively few estimates outside the [2,  2] interval, for example,
which appears to be the case. Estimates appear without (in open circles) and with
(closed disks) covariate adjustment; corresponding diamonds represent the average
for each category.
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wealthy (not in Oportunidades, no formal sector insurance, and no high asset
count) are on the right.
The one exception to complete confirmation of the success of our design is in the
category of health self-assessments. Although almost all the dots even in this cate-
gory are within the 2 to 2 interval, there appears to be a slight pattern with treat-
ment groups apparently causing the poor to report that they are healthier and the
more wealthy to report that they are sicker. Yet, individuals in the treated group
have not received any treatment other than random assignment to be encouraged
to affiliate and knowledge of this assignment. If we find in the follow-up survey an
effect that is no larger than the one here, we know now to attribute it to measure-
ment problems, such as “differential item functioning” (Holland & Wainer, 1993;
King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004) rather than to a true causal effect.12 This
result also reveals an important benefit of fielding the baseline survey: If we had no
baseline survey, and this pattern had appeared in the follow-up, we might have
incorrectly concluded that SPS was making the poor healthier but the rich, who
were enrolled in other insurance plans, less healthy.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
Published on behalf of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
- 3 - 2 - 10123
Socio-Demographics
Objective Health
Conditions and
Treatments
Self-Assessment of
Chronic Conditions
and Risk Factors
Health Self-Assessment
Health Expenditures
Satisfaction with
Provider
Diagnostic Frequency
Utilization
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Socio-Demographics
Objective Health
Conditions and
Treatments
Self-Assessment of
Chronic Conditions
and Risk Factors
Health Self-Assessment
Health Expenditures
Satisfaction with
Provider
Diagnostic Frequency
Utilization
Figure 6. Effects of random assignment on outcome measures at baseline, for
relatively wealthy families (left graph) and those who are neither poor nor wealthy
(right graph). See the caption to Figure 5 for details.
12 Because the estimates are correlated, it may be that this pattern is a random occurrence. If not, it might
be a Hawthorne effect, because many of the respondents in the group who would eventually be encour-
aged to affiliate with SPS were aware of this at the time of the survey. Lower income citizens, who would
benefit from the program, would by this account be conveying with their “biased” responses that they
would not be a burden on the system if they were given access to SPS. In contrast, those with more
income, who would likely keep their existing health insurance even if in the treated group, might not favor
the government spending a lot of money on a program they would not benefit from, and so they may be
communicating to some degree that they are in need of more help than the government is planning to
provide them. Officials indicate that this type of pattern has occurred before in response to government
programs in Mexico.
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We studied the analyses for the few other dots outside the 2 to 2 interval in these
graphs for other categories and did not find any systematic or patterns that seem
troublesome. They appear to be random occurrences, which we would expect for
some fraction of the estimates, even if the true effect were exactly zero.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This evaluation is a rare opportunity to learn about and improve a public policy
program in which Mexico is investing a great deal of time, money, and effort. A key
to the evaluation is that it is being conducted without delaying the implementation of
the program or slowing what the government views as its attempt to give millions
of people healthier and longer lives, free from health spending-induced financial
impoverishment. We do not know how Seguro Popular, or its many components,
will be evaluated in the end, but we are certain that thousands of national and
regional governments around the world, as well as their citizens, would greatly
benefit by following the lead of the Mexican government and enabling social
scientists to conduct serious, arms-length, dispassionate, scientific evaluations of
governmental programs.
In return, as scientists, we must understand, accommodate, and adapt to the
political realities in which governments and policymakers operate. High-minded
science that is not designed to fit in local politics risks accomplishing little of prac-
tical value. In addition to reporting on how we conducted this evaluation, we have
attempted in this paper to offer some methods that may make it possible for others
to design politically robust evaluations of a diverse array of different public policy
programs. We hope future researchers will be able to build on these techniques and
develop others so that policy experiments eventually become almost as common as
new public policy programs.
We believe that aspects of our “politically robust” experimental design should be
widely applicable in other policy evaluation settings, particularly in the developing
world. We know this should be possible because we adapted most parts of our
design from components that have already been used in previous evaluations. Cost
should also not be a concern in future evaluations: our project is unusually large
compared to previous efforts, but the total cost, the bulk of which is due to the
expense of running large surveys, is a tiny fraction of the cost of the program itself.
If we are able to improve future administration of SPS in only minor ways, learn
that SPS should continue to be rolled out in the same way as it has been already, or
find that the program has failed and so funds can be redirected faster, the return on
investment in terms of the financial and health benefits to the citizens of Mexico
should be orders of magnitude larger than the cost of the evaluation.
The main intended contribution of this paper, in addition to a variety of specific
technical suggestions, is the perspective of designing field experiments that are capa-
ble of surviving the problems that we can all expect will naturally occur in the real
world. In addition to the problems generated routinely in democratic systems that we
have focused on, it would also be worthwhile for future researchers to consider how
to produce evaluation methods that can survive many other types of problems as well,
such as due to logistical, administrative, technical, and implementation issues;
cultural mishaps; natural and other disasters; and the whole range of compliance
problems. We hope future researchers will work on continuing to develop new 
fail-safe evaluation methods, so that the remarkable power of experimental designs
can be fully brought to bear on the problems that affect human populations.
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Appendix A. Outcome Measures.
This appendix lists the dependent variables in our surveys used for estimating
causal effects in Figures 5 and 6 in their corresponding categories, followed by
other variables we also collected. All data, codebooks, and replication information
from this project that we are legally permitted to distribute (that is, excluding items
like the Padrón) will be made publicly available upon publication.
Utilization: Health insurance, SPS affiliation, health care available when needed,
number of prescribed medicines able to get, ease in getting needed medications,
days/week and hours/day health clinic is open, inpatient and outpatient visits.
Diagnostic Frequency: Diagnosed, treated, and presently taking medicines for
arthritis, heart disease, asthma, depression, diabetes; hypertension and hypercho-
lesterolemia diagnoses; vision difficulties.
Satisfaction with Provider Difficulties with health care providers, quality of SPS
services, satisfaction with quality SPS services, selection of and quality of services
from Instituto de Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), IMSS-Oportunidades, Instituto
de Sequridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE), SPS,
PEMEX. For both inpatients and outpatients: traveling and waiting time; cleanliness
of facilities; whether talked to respectfully and privately; received clear explanations;
had enough time for questions; involved in decisions; confidentiality; freedom to
choose provider; adequate space; treated worse by health care provider because of
sex, age, lack of money, social class, ethnic group, illness, other.
Health Expenditure: annual out of pocket health expenditures in many categories;
measures of catastrophic health expenditures (for example, greater than 30 percent
of disposable income).
Health Self-Assessment: Self-assessment of overall health; difficulty moving
around; in vigorous activities; self-care; maintaining general appearance; feeding
self; bodily aches or pain, soreness or discomfort; problems in daily life due to pain,
concentrating or remembering things, learning a new task, personal relationships
or participation in community; getting along with others; performing work or other
regular daily activities; sleeping; not feeling rested and refreshed during the day;
feeling sad, low, or depressed; problem with worry or anxiety; general satisfaction
with health.
Self-Assessment of Chronic Conditions and Risk Factors: Smoking at all or daily;
drinking alcohol and amount; eating fruits; eating vegetables; joint pain, aching,
stiffness or swelling; stiffness in joint in morning or after long rest, joint pain goes
away after exercising or movement; back pain; discomfort in chest when walking
uphill; discomfort in chest when walking; attacks of wheezing; tightness in chest;
shortness of breath without obvious cause when not engaging in physical activity;
depression.
Objective Health Conditions and Treatments: Coverage for antenatal care; acute res-
piratory infections for children; systolic blood pressure, hypertension control, diagno-
sis, and treatment; cervical exam; cholesterol level, control, diagnosis, and treatment;
diarrhea for children coverage; diabetes control coverage, diagnosis, treatment; flu
vaccine; glasses; high cholesterol; hypertensive; mammography; seeing health care
professional during pregnancy; Pap smear coverage; skilled birth attendance coverage.
Sociodemographics: weight, height, marital status, education, attend religious
services, employment, reason for unemployment.
Other Variables: Dwelling characteristics (material of floors, ceiling, walls, number
of rooms), access to services (electricity, sewage, etc), and assets owned by house-
hold; satisfaction with SPS affiliation process; social capital and stress (feeling of
security, violence, opinion on main problem faced by the country, opinion on who is
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responsible for problems in the health sector, opinion on who is responsible for the
creation of SPS, opinion on who should pay for health services; frequency of access
to news on TV, radio, newspapers, trust in media, ideological position, opinion on
Mexico’s economic, political and social situation).
Appendix B. Analysis Plans.
When each wave of post-treatment data come in, we plan to conduct analyses at
two levels, each involving more sophisticated statistical analyses. As Imai (2005)
writes, “If field experiments work perfectly … and empirical relationships are
unambiguously strong, then sophisticated statistical analysis may be unnecessary.
However, precisely because field experiments take place in the real world, such
perfection is almost never achieved in practice.”
Our first analyses from both the household and facilities surveys will be at the
level of the health cluster and will be conducted in a manner analogous to that in
the Empirical Validation section above. For variables aggregated up from the indi-
vidual survey data to the cluster level, we will multiply impute item nonresponse as
well as some entire survey responses due to the expected 8–10 percent attrition rate
for Mexican surveys like these (which is relatively low compared to surveys in the
U.S.; for example, Holzer, Quigley, & Raphael, 2003). In addition, the specific impu-
tation techniques we use will need to take account of the fact that compliance with
the experiment is estimable with appropriate models, but not predictable from stan-
dard imputation approaches (see Hirano et al., 2000).
We will also need to compensate for unit nonresponse and the resulting selection
problems that may occur, such as those who are ill and do not feel well enough to
participate, and those who have died, who will obviously not participate. Although
sample attrition is usually ignored in experiments (Goodman & Blum, 1996), doing
so can generate considerable bias (for example, Sommer & Zeger, 1991). Ignor-
ing missing data, such as via listwise deletion, or imputing assuming standard
“missing at random” assumptions would thus bias our evaluation, and so statistical
techniques designed for these problems are necessary. In addition, we will search
for evidence that SPS is working better in some areas than others, and try to charac-
terize what it is about those areas that might breed success (for example, Rosner &
Hennekens, 1978). The leading hypothesis going in is that SPS is more effective in
poorer areas. Although we have only 50 matched pairs, we might be able to detect
these differences by simply dichotomizing the same and running the same analyses.
The other key analysis to be conducted will be at the individual level, where we
attempt to estimate the individual level causal effect affiliation with SPS, and the asso-
ciated medical and financial services made available, on the health and well-being of
individuals who comply with the encouragement assignment. Compliance issues are
the key statistical problem here, as we could not randomize individuals to SPS affilia-
tion. We instead randomized encouragement (and the funds for available health care),
and so compliance with our encouragement must be estimated. It turns out to be
possible to estimate the effect of SPS using our design on compliers (that is, those who
affiliate because they are encouraged in our treatment groups and who do not affiliate
because of the lack of encouragement in our control groups), and for other groups of
interest (Hirano et al., 2000; Barnard et al., 2003). We also have an advantage over
other applications of the same ideas, because all those who were enrolled in Oportu-
nidades will be affiliated to SPS automatically, although we will have to ascertain the
extent to which these individuals are aware of their affiliation.
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Our intent-to-treat causal estimates should be of interest to policymakers, espe-
cially in the states, deciding whether and how to roll out the program in new areas.
The individual-level causal estimates should be of interest to both policymakers
and public health officials as they try to improve the operation of the program and,
ultimately, the health of the people. Throughout, we hope to find clues about what
works, what does not work, and most importantly, ways of improving the structure,
organization, operation, and focus of the SPS program.
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